South Asia as a Pakistani Fantasy

Guest Post by Samyak Dixit

Read the Previous Part in the “South Asia” Series Here

The next aspect of the “South Asia” phenomenon to study is the special excitement generated for the term among India’s most infamous neighbor, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The diligent observer will have seen how the usage of the term “South Asia” has blossomed among Pakistan’s English-educated population and elites, and within its diaspora in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom. It’s interesting enough to warrant exploration in this series.

As we’ve already seen above, the term “South Asia” was largely created by the American academic as a “politically neutral term” to categorize the region of the Indian Subcontinent, and to allow Western institutional power centers like policy makers, politicians, academics, etc. to theoretically talk about the Subcontinent in a way that doesn’t affect the “sensibilities” of other, non-Indian, countries of this region. Or, as the academic would put it, to “talk about the region in an inclusive manner”. And to no one’s surprise, at the top of the list of “countries” whose “sensibilities” would be hurt if the region continued to be called the “Indian Subcontinent” is, obviously, Pakistan.

This should really be self-evident to most. Pakistan was, after all, created as the tip of the sword of various intellectual and political movements within the Muslim population of the Indian Subcontinent. Among these various streams were the Wahhabi Movement of the 19th century and the Pan-Islamist movement of the 19th century, Islamist congregations due to global events (e.g. the Khilafat Movement), etc.

Modern-day Pakistan is a fascinating demonstration of the success of ideological education and tireless propaganda, as the Panjabi and Sindhi Muslim of 2024 would be unrecognizable even to the Panjabi and Sindhi Muslim of 1824. Very rarely do a large number of people change so quickly and so drastically. Very rarely do people transform their sense of understanding of themselves, their history, and their identity so completely. It is a phenomenon that has been lived by the Subcontinent Muslim over the last two hundred years, and one that is barely understood by non-Muslim residents of the Subcontinent.

But the winds have changed. The genie is out of the bottle. The water has passed under the bridge. There is no more “Panjabiyat” or “Sindhi culture” or “United Bangla” anymore. These concepts, though heady and emotional, represent a time and culture that no longer exists (and as many will point out, its concrete existence in the past is also doubtful, being more a representation of wishful thinking and nostalgia goggles). True to the wishes of the leaders of the Wahhabi movements of the 1800s, all “impurities” among these converts have been successfully removed. As an Indian today, there is no more Bulle Shah to communicate with, only Khadim Hussain Rizvi.

There’s a few more aspects of this dimension that deserve to be discussed. First, despite being a “Mazhabhi Qaum” (i.e. “Ideological Nation”), the pan-Islamism that was the undercurrent behind the formation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan puts it strangely at odds with the very idea of nationalism itself. After all, why would you value narrow nationalism, if your dreams and ideals speak only of a cross-national, cross-tribal unity? Pan-Islamists are as disgusted by “narrow” nationalism as Marxists, whose own 19th-century bearded Prophet clearly asked “Workers of the World” to unite, not just workers of individual nations. Second, the bizarre nature of the creation of Pakistan, inspired by Pan-Islamism, Kemalism, but spearheaded by the All India Muslim League, means that there is something undeniably Indian about the Pakistan movement. It is, correctly understood, the political and national manifestation of the same factors that guide Muslim politics in India even today – the Psychology of Separateness (as we have already discussed previously in the series). What the Burqa and Skull Cap are at the personal level – the Permanent Dialectical Mutiny of the Convert against the majority culture – what the desire for separate legal structures, education institutions are at the societal and legal level – Pakistan represents for the Subcontinent Muslim at the level of nation and politics.

This is the unspeakable truth about Pakistan. It is a creation of the political and intellectual aspirations of the Indian Muslim over the last two-hundred years. But we in India now live in a bizarre situation where the need for public-facing national coherence in a post-Partition world means this above fact cannot be true. The very discussion of this fact in India will be perceived by the Shuddho consensus as a threat to their idea of national unity and coherence, something they call “our idea of India”. A great example of this dynamic can be found in this discussion between Indian politician and leading Shuddho voice Shashi Tharoor, and Harsh Madhusudhan, an author and investor. I don’t entirely blame the Shuddho consensus either. The most charitable reading of their plight is that they are trying to make the best of the terrible hand that the Indian Republic was dealt with in its creation by the British in 1947.

But one thing is certain. This confusion, and this theater, about the truth that everyone knows but cannot say in public, leads to a very twisted discussion about Pakistan in India, one rooted in falsehood from the axiomatic level. But, as should be expected, this confusion does not exist in Pakistan itself. The Pakistani idea knows that it was created as a fortuitous collaboration between the Dreams of the Muslim elite of Northern India and the political aspirations of the newly defined and developed Bengali Muslim identity. It is under no disillusions about its continuity with the Indian Muslim political history, which is why Pakistani elites associate themselves strongly with the “achievements” of the Moguls, the various Sultanates in India, and even post-Mogul figures like Tipu Sultan and the Nizam of Hyderabad.

The Pakistani idea of a national identity (paradoxical with their pan-Islamist roots, yes) is firmly rooted in this mix of religion-based-separatism combined with convenient ideas plucked out of early-20th-century notions of nationalism. They are under no delusions about this, no matter how much Indian Shuddho insists that “Pakistanis are wrong about what they think of their own identity and history”. Which is why, despite the obvious tribal and ethnic contradictions between the Panjabi, Sindhi and Pashtun Pakistani, the nation itself remains relatively coherent and stable. As our old friend Professor Carol Christine Fair says, “Pakistan is the most stable insanity”. And here, in this one instance, she is absolutely right. The Pakistani view of its own identity is, at the same time, incredibly confused but remarkably sturdy. Pakistan’s confusion is limited to what it is, but it is certain about what it is not. Its certainty lies in the fact that, no matter its confusion about where its identity lies, it is absolutely, one-hundred percent, not India. Being even more specific, it associates with Indian Muslim history (as discussed above). So it is actually the Dharmic (Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain) history and culture of India that Pakistan and Pakistanis dissociates itself with. It is the convert’s rejection of his pre-conversion past, taken to its natural conclusion at the level of history and memory. And it is objectively wrong and grounded in falsehood at a deeper level than any phenomenon we have discussed in this series.

This is where the term “South Asia” solves a very specific problem for Pakistan and its ideological class. Despite their religion-based identity as a nation, Pakistan suffers from a well-known internal identity crisis. This is especially apparent in the discourses of the various ethnic identities which make up the post-1971 Pakistani population. The resident of Multan, for example, will be at pains to tell you how his language Saraiki is very different from “Lahori” Panjabi, despite most of the outside world just considering Multan to be another Panjabi city (it’s not). Despite their aggressive religious identity, the Pakistani individual lacks an authentic story of his historical belonging. In their pursuit of putting their newly-acquired religious identity über alles, the Pakistani has rejected his centuries-long national and regional identity (that of being a north-western Indian). Pakistanis have traded away their national identity to preserve their identity as Subcontinent convert Muslims. This replacement identity of “Pakistani” is eighty years old, ankle-deep, and in contradiction with the historical development of things like language, culture, etc. of the regions of Panjab, Sindh, Bengal, etc. This is why (as is repeated ad nauseam) the modern Pakistani looks to Muslim countries like Turkey and Iran to establish more cultural coherence as a nation. This is why the Pakistani of today looks at battles fought by Arabs and Turks in the 7th-11th centuries and uses the expression “Hamari Taarikh” (“our history”). It is a level of identity colonization for which there is very little comparison.

This should be a confusing thing for any objective, external and neutral observer. The natural expectation from Pakistan would be that over time, it would want to associate with its eastern neighbors India and Bangladesh, with whom it shares languages (Panjabi, Urdu, Sindhi, Kashmiri), food, culture, history, etc. It would be natural for Pakistan to categorize itself with India and Bangladesh, given the history of the three countries. But this is the one thing Pakistanis cannot do. They do not want to be caught dead being associated with the term “Indian”, or, god-forbid, with those dark-skinned Bangladeshis… Pakistan certainly doesn’t want to be seen as being located in the “Indian Subcontinent”. ****That just sounds too … Indian!

We see examples of this on the internet when the “weak” (a trait that the Pakistani sense of self associates with India’s “Hinduness”) Indians or dark-skinned Bangladeshis achieve something that draws international praise and attention. A strange FOMO overtakes the Pakistani and he wants to be associated with this positive news. India’s Chandrayan 3 achievement magically becomes a “huge moment for South Asia and countries regarded as third world”. Bangladesh’s economic growth being celebrated in the global media becomes a reason to cheer for the “South Asia Index”, an account on X based in Pakistan. A sports team from India or Bangladesh doing well in a global competition becomes a reason for happiness for all “South Asians”. The Pakistani really wants to have his cake and eat it too! But he is also mindful of not going too overboard with his praise, because doing so would be associating yourself too strongly with the things that are considered “Indian”…

As we can see, “South Asia” is the one-stop solution for the Pakistani to deal with his permanent identity crisis.

We can find further examples of bizarre and inconsistent faux-association that Pakistanis want to do with the rest of the region, ones where we can see that the term “South Asia” is often used as a euphemistic replacement for “Pakistani”, as the latter now carries negative connotations. Consider this post on X by the Gray Lady herself. Talking about something as mundane and apparently apolitical as Chicken Manchurian, the social media coordinator says that the dish is a “stalwart of Pakistani Chinese cooking, chicken Manchurian is immensely popular at Chinese restaurants across South Asia”. However, the website of the Gray Lady stir-fries the X post and adds to the confusion. Here the words used are that the dish is a “stalwart of Desi Chinese cooking, chicken Manchurian is immensely popular at Chinese restaurants across South Asia”.

If you’ve been following this series of articles, nothing about this should surprise you. We’ve already discussed in our section on Diaspora “Southasianism” about how the phrase “South Asia” is often paired/used interchangeably with “Brown” and “Desi”. It should also not surprise you that the article is from Pakistani-American food journalist Zainab Shah. The NYT’s hiring and editorial decisions in their “South Asia” beat disproportionately favors individuals who are of Subcontinent Muslim descent (in a way that can be only described as a conscious hiring policy), and Ms. Shah certainly fits this criteria.

What’s truly fascinating for me is that even in something as banal and supposedly-uncontroversial like food, the ideologues at the Gray Lady cannot help themselves. The praxis must continue, and everything (no matter how unrelated to politics) must be politicized, in a way that is reminiscent of Victor Klemperer’s story of how cat magazines in mid-century Germany slowly started talking about the “German Cat” as the Nazis grew in power. Even in the description or categorization of something as mundane as an Indo-Chinese food dish, the American priestly class is continuing its praxis to make talking about the Indian subcontinent “more inclusive”. It’s a demonstration of two things: (1) the genuine complexity of the history of the subcontinent and (2) the ideological obsession and dogmatism of the American priestly class. And because of the factors we have discussed in this part of the series, one should expect to find Pakistani or Pakistani-American journalists to be at the forefront of this propaganda effort, and in other related efforts like the “South Asian Journalists Association”.

As we end this article in the series, we will talk about an example that gives us even more evidence that “South Asia” and its increased adoption is perhaps most vital for Pakistanis and the Pakistani diaspora in Western countries. Rarely does one start writing an essay based on a nebulous hunch but then find something during research that so thoroughly vindicates their point:

We will end by learning about “SouthAsia Magazine”.

I loved stumbling onto this magazine and website for many reasons. It is the perfect crystallization, a one shot encapsulation, of the points I have made in this part of my South Asia series. Of course, a magazine named “SouthAsia” would be run out of Karachi and have the url of “southasia.com.pk”. Of course, the Pakistani has the most to gain from the imposition of this phrase by the American academic. Of course, it is a magazine run out of Pakistan and is disproportionately focused on Pakistani foreign and domestic policy, despite taking on the label of “SouthAsia” (in that way, the name and focus areas of the magazine are a perfect fit). Of course, our old friend Carol Christine Fair, the world’s most staunch “Southasianist”, has already written for the magazine, which further establishes its credentials. A magazine named “SouthAsia” being founded and run out of Karachi, and focusing on Pakistani affairs, is the most fitting fate for the term “South Asia”. Pakistan is where the most necessity and energy for this exogenous term lies, and it is only fair that they take the term and try to evangelize the cause.

In conclusion, while “South Asia” is a term invented by the American academic, it has been embraced most strikingly in Pakistan. When one considers all angles of this from Pakistan’s point of view – the identity crisis, the complex history of the Partition, the role of the Indian Muslim in creating Pakistan – it’s almost like the term has been designed specifically to cater to Pakistani “sensibilities”.

Americans and other Westerners (particularly the British as the architects) like to be value-neutral when discussing the Partition of India, and therefore push to be “inclusive” while talking about the region. But in reality, there is what I believe to be an objective fact to the Partition of India. Pakistan was created on the basis of religious separatism at the cost of cleansing the provinces of Panjab, Bengal and Sindh of their non-Muslim populations. Being “inclusive” of this ideology of separatism and bigotry is the cost that the American academic is willing to pay, for some reason. And this leads to the creation of strange bedfellows – the über-progressive Southasianist American academic and the Pakistani nationalist who is guided by pure bigotry and separatism – to want to endlessly propagandize this alien term.

However, unfortunately for the Pakistani opportunist and the American academic, they are not the only decision makers for whether South Asia will be adopted widely as a term to describe the Indian Subcontinent. Rather regrettably, Indians get a say in this too. And Indians have no obligations towards satisfying the Southasianist American academic’s bizarre quest for “inclusivity” or the Pakistani negotiation of its own identity crisis. Neither of these are the problems of Indians. We Indians know that the Partition of India happened, and that it happened on religious lines. We live with the progeny of the people who were displaced from their ancestral homes in 1947 and had to flee to other parts of India to take refuge. The bloodshed and displacement were real parts of our history, and the vast majority of us have no interest in whitewashing it. We also don’t have anything to gain from the adoption of “South Asia”, as we have not been offered anything in return for surrendering the supposed India-centrism that is propagated by the term “Indian Subcontinent”.

But despite this, the term “South Asia” has begun to see minor adoption in India, and has proved to be incredibly controversial in the process. This will be the topic of our next article in this series – the role, adoption and fault lines around the usage of “South Asia” within India.

This is the fifth part of a multipart series. To follow along & find more of Samyak, follow him at his Twitter & Substack