Guest Post by Abhivardhan

I had an amazing discussion on the history of World War II with Dr Robert Lyman on the Battle of Kohima and the American-Chinese relationships involved here. The question with respect to the discussion I asked myself were definitely not whether I agreed with him or not on his understanding of Indian history, with respect to the ending days of the British Raj. It is for the viewers and the readers of this article to decide. However, it just came across my mind, because the real question with respect to this new idea (or pretended-to-be-the-new-idea) called the “Indo-Pacific” should have been this, which is the basic premise of this enquiry piece:

Whether the Indo-Pacific as a normative construct engages and establishes that there are Indian realities, based on Indian policy constructs, without any post-colonial dilemma?

For now, the European Union, China and the United States have made clear their vision on the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific, geographically, would not be limited to the area covered by the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Arctic region will have an important role to convey, as this construct develops with time. The territorial aspects of the former construct, that is, Asia-Pacific — considering the Belt and Road Initiative, cannot be ignored, despite their cost-benefit issues. The role of the United States however, as dynamically disruptive as it has become, made it clear that the Eurocentric construct of the Indo-Pacific is not going to be helpful, which is part of the reason a new approach is needed.

Now, the answer to the question, considering the Second World War realities, is that the Indo-Pacific cannot be completely considered as an absolute negation of China as a territory and the source of diplomatic, economic and political influences. It would be beyond the charismatic failure that the Indo-Pacific aspirant countries are even thinking of. Second, nevertheless the fact that China cannot provide an international law construct, which makes sense for a moderate and contemporary approach to the global order, it is not deniable that the United States cannot be considered an alternative either. We need an alternative power-centre, which defines international law, but invites more pluralist and disagreeing parties, and stem the consensus steeply. In the context of the realpolitik, the West is deeply confused or is seeking the end of the “modernization” it has envisioned and monopolized in it. Coloniality matters even in the realpolitik because it defines the power-competence notions and structures. Civilization states and nation-states are common enough to devise their own tools, which can be bottom-up, top-bottom/top-down, or maybe a mix or compromised merger of both of the hierarchical undertakings. It is a complex story anyways. So, here are my questions out of conviction towards the current proponents, and sponsors of the Indo-Pacific construct:

• What do they really mean by “inclusive”? Is it limited to technocratisation or does it really have meaningful goals, where India and other Asian powers will gain some say to change and envision the rules?
• Will international law become truly a decentralized concept, like distributed ledger ontologically? This is being asked because the so-called decentralized idea stems from unipolar scholarly and political notions of “law of civilized nations”, which cannot be denied at all.
• How will multilateralism shape and become relevant?
• What kind of realpolitik we want? Multi-polar, where decolonial and modern views and realities come on consensus, since the focus is now shifting to the East?
• Will the absolute idea of negating China (we know it exists, and is expressly undeniable) has some planning, or is merely based on the Taiwan-CCP dichotomy?
• How will eurocentrism be replaced by plurilateral, decolonised and neorealist approaches to geopolitics to attain an adaptable rules-based international order? Having a rules-based order is reasonable, provided there is better leverage to concede.
• Will Indo-Pacific be India-centric, central to how India seeks Asia, not as a China-replacer, but as a formidable nation-state, which can pave way for Europe, Africa and Americas forward, from an evolutionary perspective?

It is sometimes better to ask questions, however naive they seem to be. Instead of obsessing around to make the Five Eyes countries convinced for the Indo-Pacific so long (Australia might be a special exception considering their slow approach to political motivation+consensus, or maybe not) — India should shower upon Europe and Africa wherever necessary. Sufficient collaboration with MENA countries, including Afghanistan would be required to further the multi-alignment agenda.

Is Multi-Alignment Decolonial or Post-Colonial?

This is an incredibly interesting question I ponder upon. I have no final answer to this. However, I must say that while the foundational indicative factors are visible, considering India’s approach, despite the colonial realities of the realpolitik, India still is stuck in the post-colonial, TWAIL hangover, which it has to avoid. Well, a decolonial approach to multi-alignment, might initially seem to be without any return of investment, but would matter a lot, as the East is gaining value month by month. China is a nation-state these days, but yes, its state-guided capitalism, which of course matters more for Asian states like India, Japan, Korea (Republic of) and so on, has a civilizational embarkment, even if it is not a civilization state.

Strategically, another way India can truly achieve a decolonial policy, is by ducking post-modernism. The good part is — that post-modernism is unacceptable under international law and geopolitics, even in the West, since it has severe implications towards creating unnecessary conflict polities and economies. China cannot adopt post-modernism, and India does not need it. The best way perhaps India can seek decoloniality through is by treating post-coloniality the way its Union Government treated Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. I am leaving this excerpt related to former PM Nehru. However, the gestation time, must be short, and steady. Post-coloniality is not decolonization, which shows why the Non-Aligned Movement was post-colonial yet a weak state policy. Since, India’s transition from a weak state to a strong or medium strong state is passive and like some Moore’s Law, much is awaited to be seen.

If there would have been a Moore’s Law in Indian public policy, it would have been:

The more new reforms in governance or government matters come, the more vigorous and disruptive its opposition is motivated.

What it means is this:

1. Political consensus doesn’t exist in India at all because everyone from bureaucrats to lawyers to voters are clueless, which is largely true.
2. It’s not that no one cares about policy, but since there is no political consensus on anything, political disagreements/motivation becomes the new Consensus like saying Zoom and Google Meet tried to become the new normal in Lockdown times.
3. The more significant and new reforms come, the slower their implementation becomes.

Hence, decoloniality in governance, from a geopolitics consideration, must be based on the understanding that a strong centralized Union Government, which embraces bottom-up political motivation and consensus, by extending access to cooperation to local government bodies, can act better, to achieve the goals sought through the tunnel of post-coloniality.

Abhivardhan is the Founder and Chairperson of the Indian Society of Artificial Intelligence and Law as well as the President of the Global Law Assembly. This article was originally posted on his Medium.

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Each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opacity.

Frantz Fanon